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Over the past century, the nexus of imperialism and financialism has become a major axis 
of Marxist theory and praxis. Many Marxists consider this nexus to be a cause of worldy 
ills, but the historical role they ascribe to it has changed dramatically over time. The key 
change  concerns  the  nature  and  direction  of  surplus  and  liquidity  flows.  The  first 
incarnation of the nexus, articulated at the turn of the twentieth century, explained the 
imperialist scramble for colonies to which finance capital  could export its ‘excessive’ 
surplus. The next version posited a neo-imperial world of monopoly capitalism where the 
core’s surplus is absorbed domestically, sucked into a ‘black hole’ of military spending 
and financial intermediation. The third script postulated a World System where surplus is 
imported from the dependent periphery into the financial core. And the most recent 
edition explains the hollowing out of the U.S. core, a ‘red giant’ that has already burned 
much of its own productive fuel and is now trying to ‘financialize’ the rest of the world in 
order  to  use  the  system’s  external  liquidity.  This  paper  outlines  this  chameleon-like 
transformation, assesses what is left of the nexus and asks whether it is worth keeping. 
 
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction    
 
Over the past century, Marxism has been radically transformed in line with circumstances 
and fashion. Theses that once looked solid have depreciated and fallen by the sideline; 
concepts  that  once  were  deemed  crucial  have  been  abandoned;  slogans  that  once 
sounded clear and meaningful have become fuzzy and ineffectual. But two key words 
seem to  have survived the  attrition and withstood the test of time: imperialism  and 
financialism.2  
Talk of imperialism and financialism – and particularly of the nexus between 
them – remains catchy as ever. Marxists of different persuasions – from classical, to neo to 
post – find the two terms expedient, if not indispensable. Of course, the views between 
them differ greatly, but there is a common thread: for most Marxists, imperialism and Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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financialism  are major causes of  worldly ills. Their nexus is said to explain capitalist 
development and underdevelopment; to underlie capitalist power and contradictions; 
and to drive capitalist globalization, its regional realignment and local dynamics.  
The secret behind this staying power is flexibility. Over the years, the concepts 
of imperialism and financialism have changed more or less beyond recognition, as a result 
of which the link between them nowadays connotes something totally different from 
what it did a century ago.  
The purpose of our article is to outline this chameleon-like transformation, to 
assess what is left of the nexus and to ask whether this nexus is still worth keeping. In so 
doing, our goal is not to present our own view of the nexus, but rather to critique what 
others have written about it (for our analysis of capitalism see Nitzan and Bichler, 2009). 
We try to stick to the categories and units of the theories we examine – categories and 
units with which we often disagree – so that we can compare and contrast the theories on 
their own terms. And we make no attempt to pick and choose. We do not try to decide 
which version of the nexus is correct in some universal sense, and not even which version 
was correct for its time. Instead, our aim is to highlight the historical development of the 
nexus,  particularly  the  loose  manner  in  which  it  has  been  altered  –  to  the  point  of 
meaning everything and nothing. 
The paper comprises two parts. The first part examines the different schools. It 
traces the transmutation of the nexus – from its first articulation in the early twentieth 
century, to the version developed by the Monopoly Capital school, to the arguments of 
dependency and Word Systems analyses, to the thesis of hegemonic transition. The 
second  part  offers  an  empirical  exploration.  Focusing  specifically  on  the  hegemonic 
transition  hypothesis,  it  identifies  difficulties  that  arise  when  the  theory  meets  the 
evidence and assesses their significance for the century-old nexus. 
 
PART I: THE SC PART I: THE SC PART I: THE SC PART I: THE SCHOOLS HOOLS HOOLS HOOLS    
    
Empire and Finance Empire and Finance Empire and Finance Empire and Finance  
  
The twin notions of imperialism and financialism emerged at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  The  backdrop  is  familiar  enough.  During  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth 
century, the leading European powers were busy taking over large tracts of non-capitalist 
territory around the world. At the same time, their own political economies were being 
fundamentally transformed. Since the two developments unfolded hand in hand, it was 
only natural for theorists to ask whether they were related – and if so, how and why.  
The  most  influential  explanation  came  from  a  British  left  liberal,  Hobson 
(1902), whose work on the subject was later extended and modified by Marxists such as 
Hilferding  (1910),  Luxemburg  (1913),  Kautsky  (1914),  and  Lenin  (1917),  among Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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others.  
Framed in a nutshell, the basic argument rested on the belief that capitalism 
had changed: originally ‘industrial’ and ‘competitive’, the system had become ‘financial’ 
and ‘monopolistic’ (Hilferding, 1910, Ch. 14; Lenin, 1917, pp. 190 and 193-194).  
This  transformation,  said  the  theorists,  had  two  crucial  effects.  First,  the 
process of monopolization and the centralization of capital in the hands of the large 
financiers made the distribution of income far more unequal, and that greater inequality 
restricted the purchasing power of workers relative to the productive potential of the 
system. As a result of this imbalance, there emerged the spectre of ‘surplus capital’, excess 
funds that could not be invested profitably in the home market. And since this surplus 
capital could not be disposed of domestically, it forced capitalists to look for foreign 
outlets, particularly in pristine, pre-capitalist regions (Hobson, 1902, pp. 77-78, 85-86, 
106). 
Second, the centralization of capital altered the political landscape. Instead of 
the night-watchman government of the laissez-faire epoch, there emerged a strong, active 
state. The laissez-faire capitalists of the earlier era saw little reason to share their profits 
with the state and therefore glorified the frugality of a small central administration and 
minimal taxation. But the new state was no longer run by hands-off liberals. Instead, it was 
dominated and manipulated by an aggressive oligarchy of ‘finance capital’ – a coalition of 
large bankers, leading industrialists, war mongers and speculators who needed a strong 
state that would crack down on domestic opposition and embark on foreign military 
adventures (Hilferding, 1910, p. 335; Luxemburg, 1913, pp. 371, 467; Lenin, 1917, pp. 
243-244). 
And  so  emerged  the  nexus  between  imperialism  and  financialism.  The 
concentrated financialized economy, went the argument, requires pre-capitalist colonies 
where surplus capital can be invested profitably; and the cabal of finance capital, now in 
the political driver’s seat, is able to push the state into an international imperialist struggle 
to obtain those colonies. 
At the time, this thesis was not only totally new and highly sophisticated; it also 
fit closely with the unfolding of events. It gave an elegant explanation for the imperial 
bellicosity of the late nineteenth century, and it neatly accounted for the circumstances 
leading to the great imperial conflict of the first ‘World War’. There were of course other 
explanations for that war – from realist/statist, to liberal, to geopolitical, to psychological 
(see, for example, Veblen,  1915;  Schumpeter, 1919; Tuchman, 1962 and 1966; and 
Kennedy, 1987, Ch. 5). But for most intellectuals, these alternative explications seemed 
too partial or instrumental compared to the sweeping inevitability offered by the nexus of 
empire and finance.  
History, though, kept changing, and soon enough both the theory and its basic 
concepts had to be altered.  
 Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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Monopoly Capital Monopoly Capital Monopoly Capital Monopoly Capital    
 
The end of the Second World War brought three major transformations. First, the nature 
of international conflict changed completely. Instead of a violent inter-capitalist struggle, 
there emerged a Cold War between the former imperial powers and the United States on 
the one hand and the Soviet bloc on the other (with plenty of hot proxy conflicts flaring 
up  in  the  outlying  areas).  Second,  the  relationship  between  core  and  periphery  was 
radically  altered.  Outright  conquest  and  territorial  imperialism  gave  way  to 
decolonization, while tax-collecting navies were replaced by the more sophisticated tools 
of  foreign  aid  and  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI).  Third  and  finally,  the  political 
economies of the core countries themselves were reorganized. Instead of the volatile 
laissez-faire  regime,  there  arose  a  large  welfare-warfare  state  whose  ‘interventionist’ 
ideologies  and  counter-cyclical  policies  managed  to  reduce  instability  and  boost 
domestic growth.  
On  the  face  of  it,  this  new  constellation  made  talk  of  finance-driven 
imperialism seem outdated, if not totally irrelevant. But the theorists didn’t give up the 
nexus. Instead, they gave it a new meaning.  
The revised link was articulated most fully by the Monopoly Capital school 
associated with the New York journal Monthly Review (important contributions include 
Kalecki, 1943; Steindl, 1952; Tsuru, 1956; Baran and Sweezy, 1966; and Magdoff, 1969). 
Capitalism, argued the writers of this school, remains haunted by a lack of profitable 
investment outlets. And that problem, along with its solution, can no longer be explained 
in classical Marxist terms (Baran, 1957, pp. 22 and 23, fn. 3; Baran and Sweezy, 1966, pp. 
6 and 10, fn. 6).  
The shift from competition to  oligopoly that began in the  late nineteenth 
century, these writers claimed, was now complete (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, Chs. 2 and 
8). And that shift meant that Marx’s labour theory of value and his notion of surplus value 
had become more or less irrelevant to capitalist pricing.3  
In the brave new world of oligopolies, the emphasis on non-price competition 
speeds up the pace of technical change and efficiency gains, making commodities cheaper 
and cheaper to produce. But unlike in a competitive system, where market discipline 
forces firms to pass on their lower costs to consumers, under the new circumstances, cost 
reductions do not translate into falling prices. The prevalence of oligopolies creates a 
built-in inflationary bias that, despite falling costs, makes prices move up and sometimes 
sideways, but rarely if ever down (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, pp. 62-63).  
This growing divergence between falling costs and rising prices increases the 
income share of capitalists, and that increase reverses the underlying course of capitalism. 
Marx  believed  that  the  combination  of  ever-growing  mechanization  and  ruthless 
competition  creates  a  tendency  of  the  rate  of  profit  to  fall.  But  the  substitution  of Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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monopoly capitalism for free competition inverts the trajectory. The new system, argued 
its analysts, is ruled by an opposite ‘tendency of the surplus to rise’ (ibid., Ch. 3). 
The  early  theorists  of  imperialism,  although  using  a  different  vocabulary, 
understood the gist of this transformation. And even though they did not provide a full 
theory to explain it, they realized that the consequence of that transformation was to shift 
the problem of capitalism from production to circulation (or in later Keynesian parlance, 
from ‘aggregate supply’ to ‘aggregate demand’). The new capitalism, they pointed out, 
suffered not from insufficient surplus, but from too much surplus, and its key challenge 
now was how to ‘offset’ and ‘absorb’ this ever-growing excess so that accumulation could 
keep going instead of coming to a halt (Baran and Sweezy, 1966, p. 218). 
That much was already understood at the turn of the twentieth century. But 
this is where the similarity between the early theorists of imperialism and the new analysts 
of Monopoly Capital ends. 
 
Black Hole: The Role of Institutionalized Waste Black Hole: The Role of Institutionalized Waste Black Hole: The Role of Institutionalized Waste Black Hole: The Role of Institutionalized Waste    
 
Until the early twentieth century, it seemed that the only way to offset the growing excess 
was productive and external: the surplus of goods and capital had to be exported to and 
productively invested in pre-capitalist colonies. But as it turned out, there was another 
solution, one that the early theorists hadn’t foreseen and that the analysts of Monopoly 
Capital now emphasized. The surplus could also be disposed off unproductively and 
internally: it could be wasted at home. 
For the theorists of Monopoly Capital, ‘waste’ denoted expenditures that are 
necessary neither for producing the surplus nor for reproducing the population, and that 
are, in that sense, totally unproductive and therefore wasteful. These expenditures absorb 
existing surplus without creating any new surplus, and this double feature enables them to 
mitigate without aggravating the tendency of the surplus to rise. 
The absorptive role of wasteful spending wasn’t entirely new, having already 
been identified and elaborated on at the turn of the twentieth century by Veblen (1904; 
1923). But it was only after the Second Word War, with the entrenchment of the Fordist 
model of mass production and consumption and the parallel rise of the welfare-warfare 
state, that the process was fully and conscientiously institutionalized as a salient feature of 
monopoly capitalism.  
By the end of the war, the U.S. ruling class grew fearful that demobilization 
would  trigger  another  severe  depression;  and  having  accepted  and  internalized  the 
stimulating role of large-scale government spending, it supported the creation of a new 
‘Keynesian Coalition’ that brought together the interests of big business, the large labour 
unions  and  various  state  agencies  (Gold,  1977).  The  hallmark  of  this  coalition  was 
immortalized in a secret U.S. National Security Council document (NSC-68), whose 
writers effectively called on the government to use high military spending as a way to Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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secure the internal stability of U.S. capitalism.4 
According to its theorists, monopoly capitalism gave rise to many forms of 
institutionalized waste – including a bloated sales effort, the creation of new ‘desires’ for 
useless goods and services and the acceleration of product obsolescence, among other 
strategies. But the two most significant types of waste were spending on the military and 
on the financial sector (on the surplus absorption of military spending, see for example, 
Tsuru, 1956; Kalecki, 1964 and 1967; Baran and Sweezy, 1966, Cf. Ch. 7; on the role of 
finance, see Baran and Sweezy, 1966, pp. 139-141; Magdoff and Sweezy, 1983 and 1985). 
The importance of these latter expenditures, went the argument, lies in their 
seemingly limitless size. The magnitude of military expenditures has no obvious ceiling: it 
depends solely on the ability of the ruling class to justify the expenditures on the grounds 
of national security. Similarly with the size of the financial sector: its magnitude expands 
with  the  potentially  limitless  inflation  of  credit.  This  convenient  expandability  turns 
military spending and financial intermediation into a giant ‘black hole’ (our term): they 
suck in large chunks of the excess surplus without generating any excess surplus of their 
own.5  
Now, on the face of it, the efficacy of this domestic black hole should have 
made imperialism less necessary, if not wholly redundant. According to the theorists of 
Monopoly Capital, though, this would be the wrong conclusion to draw. It is certainly 
true that, unlike the old imperial system, monopoly capitalism no longer needs colonies. 
But  the  absence  of  formal  colonies  is  largely  a  matter  of  appearance.  Remove  this 
appearance and you’ll see the imperial impulse pretty much intact: the core continues to 
exploit, dominate and violate the periphery for its own capitalist ends.6  
Spearheaded by U.S.-based multinationals and no longer hindered by inter-
capitalist wars, argued the theorists, the new order of monopoly capitalism has become 
increasingly global and ever more integrated. And this global integration, they continued, 
has come to depend on an international division of labour, free access to strategic raw 
materials and political regimes that are ideologically open for business. However, these 
conditions  do  not  develop  automatically  and  peacefully.  They  have  to  be  actively 
promoted and enforced – often against stiff domestic opposition – and they have to be 
safeguarded  against  external  threats  (the  Soviet  Bloc  before  its  collapse  and  Islamic 
fundamentalism and rogue states since then, etc.). And because such promotion and 
enforcement  hinge  on  the  threat  and  frequent  use  of  violence,  there  is  an  obvious 
justification,  if  not  outright  need,  for  a  large,  well-equipped  army  sustained  by  large 
military budgets.  
In this context, military spending comes to serve a dual role: together with the 
financial sector and other forms of waste, it propels the accumulation of capital by black-
holing a large chunk of the economic surplus; and it helps secure a more sophisticated 
and effective neo-imperial order that no longer needs colonial territories but is every bit Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
 
 
 
48 
as expansionary, exploitative and violent as its crude imperial predecessor.  
    
Dependency Dependency Dependency Dependency    
      
The notion of neo-imperialism boosted and gave credence to a subsidiary theory of 
dependency  (important  texts  include  Prebisch,  1950;  Baran,  1957;  Frank,  1967; 
Emmanuel, 1972; Galeano, 1973; Amin, 1974b; Wallerstein, 1974; 1980; Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1979; for a summary of the dependency literature, see So, 1990). This support 
was somewhat paradoxical, since the lineage between the two theories was weak, if not 
contradictory. Recall that by emphasizing the role of domestic waste, particularly through 
the  open-ended  offsets  of  military  spending  and  the  financial  sector,  the  theory  of 
Monopoly  Capital  served  to  deemphasize,  if  not  totally  negate,  the  absorptive 
importance  of  the  periphery.7  But  the  analysts  of  dependency  put  their  emphasis 
elsewhere. The persistence of (neo) imperialism, they claimed, showed that, regardless of 
its  own  internal  dynamics,  the  core  still  needs  to  keep  the  periphery  chronically 
subjugated and underdeveloped. 
This dependency, went the argument, is the outcome of five hundred years of 
colonial destruction. The basic claim, originally made by Baran (1957, Ch. 5), was that 
capitalist development is inherently uneven. By the sixteenth century, this unevenness 
had created a major fracture between Europe and the periphery: the European powers 
embarked on a colonial process of primitive accumulation, a process that fuelled their 
own growth while stunting that of the periphery. 
From  then  onward,  the  imperial  powers  relentlessly  and  systematically 
undermined the socio-economic fabric of the periphery, making it totally dependent on 
the core. And when decolonization finally started, the periphery found itself unable to 
take off while the capitalist core prospered (Frank, 1966; Wallerstein, 1974). At that 
point, there was no longer any need for core states to openly colonize and export capital 
to the periphery. Using their disproportionate economic and state power, the former 
imperialist  countries  were  now  able  to  hold  the  postcolonial  periphery  in  a  state  of 
debilitating economic monoculture, political submissiveness and cultural backwardness 
– and, wherever they could, to impose on it a system of unequal exchange. 
Unequal exchange can take different forms. It may involve a wage gap between 
the ‘less exploited’ labour aristocracy of the core and the ‘more exploited’ simple labour of 
the  periphery  (Emmanuel,  1972).  Or  the  core  can  compel  the  periphery  to  buy  its 
exports at ‘high’ prices (relative to their ‘true’ value), while importing the periphery’s 
products at ‘low’ prices (relative to their ‘true’ value). As a result of the latter strategy, the 
terms of trade get ‘distorted’, surplus is constantly siphoned into the core (rather than 
exported from  or domestically absorbed by the core), and the eviscerated periphery 
remains chronically underdeveloped (Amin, 1974a).8 
This logic of dependent underdevelopment was first articulated during the Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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1950s and 1960s as an antidote to the liberal modernization thesis and its Rostowian 
promise of an imminent takeoff (Rostow, 1960). And at the time, that antidote certainly 
seemed to be in line with the chronic stagnation of peripheral countries.  
But what started as a partial theory soon expanded into a sweeping history of 
world  capitalism.  According  to  this  broader  narrative,  capitalism  was  and  remained 
imperial from the word go: it didn’t simply start with conquest; it started because of 
conquest. Its very inception was predicated on geographical exploitation and domination 
– a process in which the financial-commercial metropolis (say England) used the surplus 
extracted from a productive periphery (say India) to kick-start its own economic growth. 
And once started, the only way for this growth to be sustained is for the metropolis to 
continue to eviscerate the periphery around it. The development of the emperor depends 
on and necessitates the underdevelopment of its subjects (Galeano, 1973, pp. 38-42, 49-
51, 67-70, 86-90, 145-148, 206-216, 225-228). 
The next theoretical step was to fit this template into an even broader concept 
of  a  World  System  –  an  all-encompassing  global  approach  that  seeks  to  map  the 
hierarchical  political  relationships,  division  of  labour  and  flow  of  commodities  and 
surplus between the peripheral countries at the bottom, the semi-peripheral satellites in 
the middle and the financial core at the apex. From the viewpoint of this larger retrofit, 
capitalism is no longer the outcome of a specific class struggle, a conflict that developed in 
Western Europe during the twilight of feudalism and later spread to and reproduced itself 
in the rest of the world. Instead, capitalism – to the extent that this term can still be 
meaningfully used – is merely the outer appearance of Europe’s imperial expedition to 
rob and loot the rest of the world.  
This view reflected a fundamental change in emphasis. Whereas earlier Marxist 
theorists  of  imperialism  accentuated  the  centrality  of  exploitation  in  production, 
dependency  and  World-Systems  analysts  shifted  the  focus  to  trade  and  unequal 
exchange.  And  while  previous  theories  concentrated  on  the  global  class  struggle, 
dependency  and  World-Systems  analyses  spoke  of  a  conflict  between  states  and 
geographical regions. The new framework, although nominally Marxist on the outside, 
has little Marxism left on the inside.9 
And if we are to believe the postists who quickly jumped on the dependency 
bandwagon, there is nothing particularly surprising about this particular theoretical bent. 
After all, ‘history’ is no more than an ethno-cultural clash of civilizations, a never-ending 
cycle of imperial hegemonies in which the winners (ego) impose their culture on the 
losers (alter) (for a typical narrative, see Hobson, 2004).To the naked eye, the totalizing 
capitalization of our contemporary world may seem like a unique historical process. But 
don’t be deceived. This apparent uniqueness is a flash in the pan. Deconstruct it and what 
you are left with is yet another imperial imposition – in this case, the imposition of a 
Euro-American ‘financialized discourse’ on the rest of the world. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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Red Giant: An Empire Imploded Red Giant: An Empire Imploded Red Giant: An Empire Imploded Red Giant: An Empire Imploded    
 
The dependency version of the nexus, though, didn’t hold for long, and in the 1970s the 
cards again got shuffled. The core stumbled into a multifaceted crisis: the United States 
suffered  a  humiliating  defeat  in  Vietnam,  stagflation  intensified  and  destabilized  the 
major capitalist countries and political unrest seemed to undermine the legitimacy of the 
capitalist regime itself. In the meantime, the periphery confounded the theorists: on the 
one hand, import substitution, the prescribed antidote to dependency, pushed many 
developing countries, primarily in Latin America, into a debt trap; on the other hand, the 
inverse policy of privatization and export promotion, implemented mostly in East Asia, 
triggered an apparent ‘economic miracle’. Taken together, these developments didn’t 
seem to sit well with the notion of Western financial imperialism. So once more the nexus 
had to be revised. 
According to the new script, ‘financialization’ is no longer a panacea for the 
imperial power. On the contrary, it is a ‘sign of autumn’, prime evidence of imperial 
decline (Braudel, 1985, Vol. 3, p. 246). 
The reasoning, whether explicit or implicit, goes back to the basic Marxist 
distinction between ‘industrial’ activity on the one hand and ‘commercial’ and ‘financial’ 
activities on the other. The former activity is considered ‘productive’ in that it generates 
surplus value and leads to the accumulation of ‘actual’ capital. The latter activities, by 
contrast,  are deemed ‘unproductive’; they don’t generate any new surplus value  and 
therefore, in and of themselves, do not create any ‘actual’ capital.10  
This distinction – which most Marxists accept as sacrosanct and to which we 
return later in the article – has important implications for the nexus of imperialism and 
financialism. It may be true, say advocates of the new script, that finance (along with other 
forms  of  waste)  helps  the  imperial  core  absorb  its  rising surplus –  and  in  so  doing 
prevents  stagnation  and  keeps  accumulation  going.  But  there  is  a  price  to  pay.  The 
addiction to financial waste ends up consuming the very fuel that sustains the core’s 
imperial position: it hollows out the core’s industrial sector, it undermines its productive 
vitality,  and,  eventually,  it  limits  its  military  capabilities.  The  financial  sector  itself 
continues to expand absolutely and relatively, but this is the expansion of a ‘red giant’ (our 
term) – the final inflation of a star ready to implode. 
The process leading to this implosion is emphasized by theories of hegemonic 
transition (Cf. Braudel, 1985; Wallerstein, 1984; and Arrighi, 1994). The analyses here 
come  in  different  versions,  but  they  all  seem  to  agree  on  the  same  basic  template. 
According to this template, the maturation of a hegemonic power – be it Holland in the 
seventeenth century, Britain in the nineteenth century or the United States presently – 
coincides with the ‘over-accumulation’ of capital (i.e. the absence of sufficiently profitable 
investment outlets). This over-accumulation – along with growing international rivalries, Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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challenges and conflicts – triggers a system-wide financial expansion marked by soaring 
capital flows, a rise in market speculation and a general inflation of debt and equity 
values.11 The financial expansion itself is led by the hegemonic state in an attempt to 
arrest its own decline, but the reprieve it offers can only be temporary. Relying on finance 
drains  the  core  of  its  energy,  causes  productive  investment  to  flow  elsewhere  and 
eventually sets in motion the imminent process of hegemonic transition. 
Although the narrative here is universal, its inspiration is clearly drawn from the 
apparent ‘financialized decline’ of U.S. hegemony (Arrighi and Silver, 1999, p. 33; Arrighi 
et al., 1999, pp. 88-89). Since the 1970s, many argue, the country has been ‘depleted’: it 
has  grown  overburdened  by  military  spending;  it  has  gotten  itself  entangled  in 
unwinnable armed conflicts; and it has witnessed its industrial-productive base sucked 
dry by a Wall Street-Washington Complex that prospers on the back of rising debt and 
bloated financial intermediation.12 
In order to compensate for its growing weakness, these observers continue, the 
United States has imposed its own model of ‘financialization’ on the rest of the world, 
hoping to scoop the resulting expansion of liquidity. Some states have been compelled to 
replicate the model in their own countries, others have been tempted to finance it by 
buying U.S. assets and pretty much all have been pulled into an unprecedented global 
whirlpool of capital flow. 
However, the spread of ‘financialization’, goes the argument, has only been 
partly successful. For a while, the United States benefited from being able to control, 
manipulate and leverage this expansion for its own ends. But in the opinion of many, the 
growing severity of recent financial, economic and military crises suggests that this ability 
has been greatly reduced and that U.S. hegemony is now coming to an end.  
 
PART II: AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY PART II: AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY PART II: AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY PART II: AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY    
 
Up until now, our discussion was fairly even handed. We devoted more or less the same 
attention to each version of the nexus, and for good reason. Judged against their concrete 
historical backdrops, all versions look relevant, even solid. At their time, they all offered 
insight into the world they described and often provided a platform for popular struggle 
and alternative politics.  
But this even-handedness is superficial: although the theories themselves may 
be comparable, their empirical bases are not. When Lenin wrote his Imperialism (1917) 
in Zurich in the early twentieth century, the data on which he based his argument were 
meagre and fractured. There were no organized statistics, no time series and no aggregate 
facts to speak of. Much of his evidence was drawn from works written by Hobson twenty 
years earlier (1894; 1902). The situation was quite different half a century later. By the 
time Baran and Sweezy published their Monopoly Capital (1966), systems of national Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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accounts  had  already  been  implemented,  primarily  in  the  developed  countries,  and 
aggregate data analysis had become increasingly commonplace.13 This new infrastructure 
enabled Baran and Sweezy to enlist the help of Joseph D. Phillips, a statistical expert who 
subjected their thesis to systematic empirical examination. The result, published in the 
famous appendix to their book, was an empirical feat that Lenin could not even have 
fathomed. And yet, even Baran and Sweezy had to restrict their analysis to the United 
States, and particularly to its macro economy: national accounting were still  far  less 
developed in the rest of the world; organized statistics for corporations and financial 
intermediation were still in their infancy; and global databases were not yet on the radar 
screen. It was only in the 1980s, with the transnationalization of capital and the advent of 
cheap computing, that a global statistical picture, however imperfect, became a practical 
possibility. 
The purpose of this section is to use some of these new data to examine the 
most recent version of the nexus – the theory of hegemonic transition. The examination 
is not exhaustive, but illustrative. It seeks to highlight the importance of empirical analysis 
– both as a check on our theoretical speculations and as a catalyst for the development of 
new questions and new concepts. 
The argument is developed in steps. To put things in context, we begin by 
outlining the historical evolution of capital flow and transnational ownership; then we 
examine  the  shifting  global  distribution  of  profit  between  the  different  regions;  and 
finally,  we  zero  in  on  the  process  of  financialization  and  its  relation  to  hegemonic 
transition. 
 
Capital Flow and Transnational O Capital Flow and Transnational O Capital Flow and Transnational O Capital Flow and Transnational Ownership wnership wnership wnership    
    
The highly publicized imperial misgivings of the United States make the hegemonic-
transition version of the nexus seem persuasive. But when we look more closely at the 
facts, the theoretical surface no longer looks smooth; and as we get even closer to the 
evidence, cracks begin to appear.  
Start with the cross-border flow of capital, the international manifestation of 
‘financialization’. This process is often misunderstood, even by high theorists, so a brief 
clarification is in order. Contrary to popular belief, the flow of capital is financial, and only 
financial. It consists of legal transactions, whereby investors in one country buy or sell 
assets in another – and that is it. There is no flow of material or immaterial resources, 
productive or otherwise. The only things that move are ownership titles.14  
These changes in ownership, of course, are of great importance. If the flow of 
capital  is  large  enough,  the  stock  of  foreign-owned  assets  will  grow  relative  to 
domestically  owned  assets.  And  as  the  ratio  rises,  the  ownership  of  capital  becomes 
increasingly transnational.  
The history of this process, from 1870 to the present, is sketched in Figure 1, Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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where we plot the ratio between the value of global foreign assets and global GDP (both 
denominated in U.S. dollars). The figure contains two partly overlapping annual series: 
the thicker grey series, which covers selected years during the period 1870-2000, is taken 
from a study by Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor; the thinner black series, which covers 
the entire period of 1970-2007, is from a study by Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-
Ferretti (with full references indicated in the footnote to the figure). Both series are 
estimated based on a changing sample of countries. The ratio is computed in three steps: 
first, by aggregating the foreign assets of the available sample of countries; second, by 
computing their combined GDP; and third, by dividing the first number by the second. 
In both series, the sample size increases over time; and as the number of countries grows, 
the estimates they provide serve to better reflect the actual global ratio.15 
 
Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 1 1 1 1:  :  :  :     
Ratio of Global Gross Foreign Assets to Global GDP Ratio of Global Gross Foreign Assets to Global GDP Ratio of Global Gross Foreign Assets to Global GDP Ratio of Global Gross Foreign Assets to Global GDP    
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
NOTE:  Gross  foreign  assets  consist  of  cash,  loans,  bonds  and  equities  owned  by  non-
residents. Both gross foreign assets and GDP are estimates based on a changing sample of Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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countries. The Obstfeld & Taylor series (thick grey line) uses a sample that gradually grows 
from four countries in 1870, to seven in 1900, to 26 in 1980, to 63 in 2000. The Lane & 
Milesi-Ferretti series (thin black line) uses a sample that gradually grows from 101 countries 
in 1970, to 177 in 2000, to 178 in 2007.  
 
SOURCE: Thick grey line (1870-2000): Maurice Obstfeld and Alan. M. Taylor, Global 
Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis and Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 52-53, Table 2-1. Thin black line (1970-2007): Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-
Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign 
Assets and Liabilities, 1970-2004’, Journal of International Economics, 2007, No. 73, pp. 223-
250 (with data updated to 2007 by the authors). Downloaded on August 8, 2009, from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip. 
 
 
Admittedly, the raw numbers underlying these computations are not the most accurate. 
The data on foreign ownership are scarce; often they are of questionable quality; rarely if 
ever are they available on a consistent basis; and almost always they require painstaking 
research to collate and sometimes heroic assumptions to calibrate. There are also serious 
problems in estimating global GDP, particularly for earlier periods. Finally, the accuracy 
of the estimates changes over time, so temporal comparisons must be interpreted with 
care. But even if we take these severe limitations into consideration, the overall picture 
seems fairly unambiguous.  
The figure shows three clear periods: 1870-1900, 1900-1945 and 1945-2007. 
The late nineteenth century, marked by the imperial expansion of ‘finance capital’, saw 
the ratio of global foreign assets to global GDP grow from 0.47 in 1870 to 0.55 in 1900 
(though keep in mind the inaccuracy and bias of the early estimates). This upswing was 
reversed during the first half of the twentieth century. The mayhem, isolationism and 
protectionism brought about by the two world wars and the Great Depression on the one 
hand and the emergence of domestic ‘institutionalized waste’ on the other undermined 
the flow of capital and caused the share of foreign ownership to recede. By 1945, with the 
onset of decolonization under U.S. ‘hegemony’ and the beginning of the Cold War, the 
ratio of foreign assets to global GDP hit a record low of 0.12. This was the nadir.  
The next half century brought a massive reversal. In the early 1980s, when 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher started to peddle the wonders of neoliberalism, 
the ratio of foreign assets to GDP was already soaring; and by 2007, after a quarter 
century of exponential growth, it reached an all-time high of 1.78.16  
This final number represents a significant level of transnational ownership. 
According to recent research by the McKinsey Global Institute, between 1990 and 2006 
the global proportion of foreign-owned assets has nearly tripled, from 9% to 26% of all 
world assets (both foreign and domestically owned). The increase was broadly based: 
foreign ownership of corporate bonds rose from 7% to 21% of the world total, foreign 
ownership  of  government  bonds  rose  from  11%  to  31%  and  foreign  ownership  of Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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corporate stocks rose from 9% to 27%.17 
Of course, numbers alone tell only part of the story. The issue here is not 
merely that foreign ownership is significant in size and rapidly growing. It is also that the 
attitude  toward  such  ownership  has  changed  radically.  The  following  comparison 
illustrates this change. In 1987, Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) took advantage of the 
privatization of British Petroleum to buy 22% of the company’s outstanding shares. At the 
time, the neoliberal Thatcher government was so horrified by this attack on its national 
‘crown jewel’ that it forced KIO to reduce its stake to a more acceptable 9.9%. By contrast, 
when in 2008 Sheikh Mansoor of Abu Dhabi bought 16% of Barclays Bank – and then 
sold it less than a year later for a 70% profit – nobody even blinked.18 The difference? 
Capital has become totally vendible, within and across borders. There are no crown 
jewels any more. With the exception of ‘national-security’ companies and other such 
oddities, every asset is now fair game. During the recent crisis, the U.S. authorities all but 
begged sovereign wealth funds to buy U.S. assets (Heinrich, 2008). 
 
The Shifting Locus of Ownership The Shifting Locus of Ownership The Shifting Locus of Ownership The Shifting Locus of Ownership    
        
Having outlined the global increase in foreign ownership and the accompanying change 
in attitude, the next step is to break the aggregate front and examine the distribution of 
this ownership. This is what we do in Figure 2, which compares the foreign asset shares of 
British and U.S. owners from 1825 to the present.  
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Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 2 2 2 2:  :  :  :     
Shares of Global Gross Foreign Assets Shares of Global Gross Foreign Assets Shares of Global Gross Foreign Assets Shares of Global Gross Foreign Assets    
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
NOTE:  Gross  foreign  assets  consist  of  cash,  loans,  bonds  and  equities  owned  by  non-
residents. The dotted series for both British and U.S. owners are based on sample data from 
Obstfeld  &  Taylor,  with  global  gross  foreign  assets  representing  the  aggregate  for  an 
unspecified number of countries in 1825, four in 1870, seven in 1900 and 26 in 1980 (with 
additional increments between these signposts). The solid series for both British and U.S. 
owners are based on sample data from Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, with global gross foreign assets 
representing the aggregate for 101 countries in 1970, 177 in 2000, and 178 in 2007 (with 
incremental increases between the signposts). 
 
SOURCE: Dotted series (1825-1980): Maurice Obstfeld and Alan. M. Taylor, Global Capital 
Markets: Integration, Crisis and Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
pp. 52-53, Table 2-1. Solid series (1970-2007): Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 
‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets 
and Liabilities, 1970-2004’, Journal of International Economics, 2007, No. 73, pp. 223-250 
(with data updated and extended to 2007 by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti). Downloaded on 
August 8, 2009, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip. 
 
The figure contains two sets of partly overlapping series: each country is represented first Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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by a dotted series for 1825-1980, and second by a solid series that partly overlaps with 
and  further  extends  it  for  the  period  1970-2007  (the  data  sources,  along  with  the 
statistical caveats, are the same as for Figure 1). Note that the solid series are based on a 
larger sample of countries. Consequently, during the overlapping period of 1970-1980, 
these series show the shares of the two countries to be smaller than those measured by 
the dotted series.  
The chart shows two important differences between the earlier era of ‘classical 
imperialism’ dominated by Britain and the more recent ‘neo-imperial’ period led by the 
United States.  
First, there is the pattern of decline. British owners saw their share of global 
assets fall from the mid-nineteenth century onward, but until the end of the century their 
primacy remained intact. The real challenge came only in the twentieth century, when 
capital flow decelerated sharply and foreign asset positions were unwound; and it was 
only in the interwar period, when foreign investment gave way to capital flight, that the 
share of British owners fell below 50%.  
The U.S. experience was very different. U.S. owners achieved their primacy 
right after the Second World War, when capital flow had already been reduced to a trickle 
– and that position was undermined the moment capital flow started to pick up. In 1980, 
when U.S. ‘financialization’ started in earnest, U.S. owners accounted for only 28% of 
global foreign assets. And by 2003, when record capital flow and the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan and Iraq prompted many Marxists to pronounce the dawn of an ‘American 
Empire’, the asset share of U.S. owners had been reduced to a mere 18%.19 
Second, there is the identity of the leading owners. In the previous transition, 
power shifted from owners in one core country (Britain) to those in another (the United 
States). By contrast, in the current transition (assuming one is indeed underway) the 
contenders are often from the periphery. In recent years, owners from China, OPEC, 
Russia, Brazil, Korea and India, among others, have become major foreign investors with 
significant international positions – including large stakes in America’s ‘imperial’ debt.20 
Does this shift of foreign ownership represent the rising hegemony of countries 
such as China – or is what we are witnessing here yet another mutation of imperialism? 
Perhaps, as some observers seem to imply, we’ve entered a (neo) neo-imperial order in 
which the ‘Empire’ actually boosts its power by selling off its assets to the periphery? 
    
The Global Distribution  The Global Distribution  The Global Distribution  The Global Distribution of Profit of Profit of Profit of Profit    
  
Surprising as it may sound, such a selloff is not inconsistent with the basic theory of 
hegemonic transition. To reiterate, according to this theory, hegemonic transitions are 
always marked by a financial explosion that is triggered, led and leveraged by the core in a 
vain  attempt  to  arrest  its  imminent  decline.  Supposedly,  this  explosion  enables  the Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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hegemonic power to amplify its financial supremacy in order to (temporarily) retain its 
core status and power. And if retaining that power requires the devolution of foreign 
assets and the selloff of domestic ones, so be it.  
The question is how to assess this power. How do we know whether the core’s 
attempt to leverage global ‘financialization’ is actually working? Is there a meaningful 
benchmark for power, and how should this benchmark be used and understood? 
Unfortunately,  most  theorists  of  hegemonic  transitions  prefer  to  deal  with 
general concepts and tend to avoid the data, so it’s often unclear how they themselves 
gauge the shifting trajectories of global power. But given the hyper-capitalist nature of the 
current epoch, it seems pretty safe to begin with the bottom line: net profit.  
Net profit is the pivotal magnitude in capitalism. It determines the health of 
corporations and their ability to borrow, it tells investors how to capitalize assets and it 
sets limits on what government officials feel they can and cannot do. It is the ultimate 
yardstick of capitalist power, the category that subjugates the social individual and makes 
the whole system tick. It is the one magnitude no researcher of capitalism can afford to 
ignore.21 
Of course, the level of profit as such tells us nothing about power. Power is not 
absolute; it is relative. So in order to assess its extent and movement, our focus should be 
not the absolute magnitude of profit, but its differential size and temporal redistribution 
(see Nitzan and Bichler, 2009, Ch. 14). 
With  this  rationale  in  mind,  consider  Figure  3,  which  traces  the  changing 
distribution  of  global  net  profit  earned  by  publicly  traded  corporations.  The  chart, 
covering the period from 1974 to the present, shows three profit series, each denoting the 
profit share of a distinct corporate aggregate: (1) firms listed in the United States; (2) 
firms listed in developed markets excluding the United States; and (3) firms listed in the 
rest of the  world – i.e. in ‘emerging markets’. In all three series, the underlying raw 
earnings  are  reported  on  a  consolidated  basis:  they  include  the  net  profit  of  parent 
corporations, the earnings of domestic and foreign subsidiaries, and the earnings share in 
minority-held companies. 
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Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 3 3 3 3:  :  :  :     
Net Profit Shares of Listed Corporations (% of World Total) Net Profit Shares of Listed Corporations (% of World Total) Net Profit Shares of Listed Corporations (% of World Total) Net Profit Shares of Listed Corporations (% of World Total)    
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
NOTE: Net profit is computed as the ratio of market value to the price-earning ratio. Data for 
developed markets excluding the U.S. is calculated by subtracting from the profit of firms 
listed in developed markets the profit of firms listed in the U.S. Data for rest of the world is 
calculated by subtracting from the profit of all firms the profits of those listed in developed 
markets. Series display monthly data and are smoothed as 12-month moving averages. The 
raw  earning  data  are  reported  on  a  consolidated  basis,  including  domestic  and  foreign 
subsidiaries and the equity share in minority held firms. The last data points are for November 
30, 2011. 
 
SOURCE:  Datastream  (series  code:  TOTMKWD(MV)  and  TOTMKWD(PE)  for  the 
market value and price-earning ratio of all listed firms, respectively;  TOTMKUS(MV) and 
TOTMKUS(PE)  for  the  market  value  and  price-earning  ratio  of  U.S.-listed  firms, 
respectively;    TOTMKDV(MV)  and  TOTMKDV(PE)  for  the  market  value  and  price-
earning ratio of firms listed in developed countries, respectively).   
 
The chart demonstrates a sharp reversal of fortune. Until the mid-1980s, U.S.-listed firms 
dominated: they scooped roughly 60% of all net profits, leaving firms listed in other Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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developed markets 35% of the total and those listed in ‘emerging markets’ less than 5%.  
But then the tables turned. During the second half of the 1980s, the net profit 
share of U.S.-listed firms plummeted, falling to 36% in less than a decade. The 1990s 
seemed to have stabilized the decline, but in the early 2000s the downward drift resumed. 
By the end of the decade, U.S. firms saw their net profit fall to 30% of the world total.  
The other two aggregates moved in the opposite direction. By 2010, the profits 
of firms listed in developed countries other than the U.S. reached 50% of the total (down 
from a peak of 53% a couple of years earlier), while the share of ‘emerging market’ firms 
quadrupled to more than 20%.  
These numbers, of course, should be interpreted with care. First, note that our 
profit data here cover only publicly traded firms that are included in the Datastream 
universe of companies; they do not include unlisted firms, or listed firms that are not part 
of the Datastream universe. This  fact  means that variations in profit shares reflect  a 
combination of three very different processes: (1) changes in the amount of profit earned 
by  listed  firms,  (2)  the  pace  of  listing  and  delisting  of  firms,  and  (3)  the  adding  of 
previously excluded stock markets to the Datastream universe. The two latter factors 
became important during the late 1980s and 1990s: Europe and the ‘emerging markets’ 
saw  their  stock  market  listings  swell  as  many  private  corporations  went  public,  and 
Datastream added markets that were previously not part of its universe of companies – 
this at a time when the number of listed firms in the United States remained flat.  
Second, the location of a firm’s listing says nothing about its operations and 
owners. Many firms whose shares are traded in the financial centres of the United States 
and Europe in fact operate elsewhere. And then there is the issue of ultimate ownership. 
Recall that currently nearly one third of all global assets are owned by foreigners (and 
perhaps  more,  given  the  opaqueness  of  international  criminal  ties  and  money 
laundering). This proportion is already large enough to make it difficult to determine the 
‘nationality of capital’, and if it were to rise further the whole endeavour would become an 
exercise in futility.  
The theoretical implications of these caveats have received little or no attention 
from  students  of  hegemonic  transitions,  and  their  quantitative  implications  remain 
unclear. But even if we take the ‘nationality of capital’ at face value and consider the 
numbers in Figure 3 as accurate and representative of this nationality, it remains obvious 
that  ‘financialization’  has  not  worked  for  the  hegemonic  power:  despite  the  alleged 
omnipotence  of  its  Wall  Street-Washington  Complex,  despite  its  control  over  key 
international  organizations,  despite  having  imposed  neoliberalism  on  the  rest  of  the 
world, and despite its seemingly limitless ability to borrow funds and suck in global 
liquidity – the bottom line is that the net profit share of U.S.-listed corporations has kept 
falling and falling.22 
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The Engine of ‘Financialization’ The Engine of ‘Financialization’ The Engine of ‘Financialization’ The Engine of ‘Financialization’    
 
Now, in and of itself, the collapse of the U.S. profit share – much like the selloff of U.S. 
assets – isn’t at odds with the theory of hegemonic transition. To repeat, this theory 
suggests that the hegemonic/imperial power, having been weakened by its prior financial 
excesses (among other ills), will kick-start, promote and sustain a system-wide process of 
‘financialization’. According to this theory, the latent purpose is to leverage this process in 
order to slow down the hegemon’s own decline – but nowhere does the theory say that 
this ‘strategy’, whether premeditated or implemented on the go, has to succeed. 
Presented  in  this  way,  the  story  sounds  historically  compelling,  logically 
consistent and empirically convincing – but only if we can first establish one basic fact. 
We need to show that the global process of ‘financialization’ indeed has been led by the 
United States. This is the starting point. Only if U.S. ‘financialization’ preceded, was 
bigger than and propelled ‘financialization’ in the rest of the world can we speak of the 
United States leveraging this process for its own ends. And only then can we assess 
whether that leveraging has succeeded or failed.  
So let’s look at the evidence. 
 
Concepts and Methods: How to Measure ‘Financialization’? Concepts and Methods: How to Measure ‘Financialization’? Concepts and Methods: How to Measure ‘Financialization’? Concepts and Methods: How to Measure ‘Financialization’?    
 
The initial step in this sequence is to measure ‘financialization’. Conceptually, the task 
may seem simple. All we need to do is calculate the share of financial activity in overall 
economic activity and then trace the trajectory of the resulting ratio. When this ratio goes 
up, we can say that the economy is being ‘financialized’; when it comes down, we would 
conclude that it is being ‘de-financialized’.  
But that is easier said than done.23 
Begin with the term ‘financialization’. The concept is rooted in the classical 
debate  on  the  source  of  productivity,  a  controversy  that  began  with  the  French 
Physiocrats,  if  not  earlier,  and  that  continues  to  haunt  economists  till  this  very  day. 
Situated in this larger debate, Marxists tend to identify economic activity as productive if 
it generates surplus value. Exploitation of workers in the production of commodities, they 
say, generates such surplus value and is therefore productive. By contrast, commerce and 
finance do not generate surplus value (but merely appropriate it), which makes them 
unproductive. The concept of ‘financialization’ draws on this distinction. It denotes a shift 
of emphasis from industrial production to unproductive financial activity – a process that 
is dominated by financiers, directed by financial organizations and governed by the logic 
of financial intermediation. 
The reality of this shift, though, remains elusive. One basic difficulty is that, 
unlike during the early twentieth century, when Rudolf Hilferding published his treatise Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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on Finance Capital, the entity of ‘finance’ can no longer be equated, however superficially, 
with ‘banks’, and not even with ‘financial institutions’ more generally. Over the past half 
century, the process of conglomeration has created highly diversified corporate giants 
whose ‘financial’ operations cannot be meaningfully disentangled from their ‘productive’ 
and ‘commercial’ dealings. 
And that is just for starters. Contemporary capitalism has become thoroughly 
mediated through discounting and capitalization, and that fact makes every mediated 
activity both ‘economic’ and ‘financial’ at the same time. In this context, discriminating 
between the veneer of financial mediation that is common to all market activity and 
activity that is ‘purely’ financial becomes a Sisyphean task.  
The main stumbling block here is that, despite hundreds of years of theorizing 
and  endless  claims  to  the  contrary,  economists  do  not  know  how  to  identify 
‘productivity’, let alone measure it. In the mainstream case, the productivity of an input is 
counted in terms of the universal utils the input generates. But utils are totally fictitious 
units.  They  have  no  objective  existence,  even  on  paper.  So  liberals  have  grown 
accustomed to going in reverse. Instead of measuring the util productivity of an input 
directly, they deduce it indirectly, by assuming it is ‘revealed’ by income. According to this 
logic, if the CEO of Goldman Sachs earns 100,000 times more than an Exxon mechanic, 
he must be 100,000 times more productive. However, since their respective productivity 
can never be observed independently of the associated income, the above conclusion 
ends up hanging on nothing but faith. 
Sadly,  Marxist  computations  do  not  fare  much  better.24  Contrary  to 
mainstream economists, for whom productivity is determined by the generation of utils, 
for Marxists it hinges on the production of surplus value. In this framework, the CEO of 
Goldman  Sachs,  by  virtue  of  his  ‘financial’  function  as  a  banking  executive  cannot 
generate surplus value and therefore is unproductive; by contrast, an Exxon mechanic, 
engaged  in  the  industrial  production  of  the  oil,  generates  surplus  value  is  therefore 
productive.  
But  this  argument,  too,  has  a  lethal  glitch.  Value  and  surplus  value  are 
denominated in universal units of socially necessary abstract labour, and these units are 
no more real than neoclassical utils. Marxists have never been able to objectively observe, 
let alone measure, them independently of prices, and this inability leads to a dead end: 
without a measurement independent of prices, there is no way to verify who actually 
generates surplus value and who does not; without knowing (rather than assuming) 
where surplus value is generated, there is no objective means of separating productive 
from unproductive activity; and without that separation, the decision of what constitutes 
a ‘purely’ financial activity becomes arbitrary.  
One popular way around this obstacle is to associate productive activity with 
profit and financial activity with net interest (and in some looser versions, also with 
dividends, rent, excessive depreciation and amortization, taxes and other forms of so-Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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called ‘rentier income’). From this perspective, the extent of ‘financialization’  can be 
approximated by measuring the ratio of net interest to profit income (or some similar 
variant): the higher this ratio, the greater the ‘financialization’, and vice versa (see for 
example Krippner, 2005; Epstein and Jayadev, 2005; Crotty, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008, 
especially Ch. 2). 
This framework, though, can be very misleading, even by its own logic. To 
begin with, the ratio of interest to profit as such has nothing to do with ‘financialization’: it 
does not show the growing importance of financiers; it does not show the greater role of 
financial intermediation; and it does not show the increasing subjugation of society to the 
principles of financial calculations. In the national accounts, the magnitude ‘net interest’ 
denotes the interest payments that private enterprises make to their creditors less the 
interest payments that private enterprises receive from their debtors.25 This net interest, 
like profit, is a legal classification of capitalist income. In this classification, net interest is 
the return on debt, whereas profit is a return on equity. And that’s basically it.  
Further, and more importantly for our purpose, there is no correspondence 
between interest and profit on the one hand and the type of production on the other. All 
corporations – whether they are an Exxon (typically classified as ‘industrial’), a Mitsubishi 
Trading (classified as ‘commercial’), or a Goldman Sachs (classified as ‘financial’) – are 
capitalized through both debt and equity and therefore pay both interest and profits. The 
result is that, all else being equal, the higher the debt/equity ratio in a society, the greater 
the ratio of net interest to profit – regardless of what is being produced or how it is 
produced. And since both debt and equity are ‘financial’ entities to start with, the ratio of 
net interest to profit can tell us nothing about the degree of ‘financialization’. 
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But not all is lost. For the sake of argument, we can forgo our reservations and stick with 
the most basic conventions. And the convention – at least among capitalists, investors 
and, increasingly, academic students of the subject – is to treat ‘finance’ as synonymous 
with  the  FIRE  sector;  i.e.  with  firms  whose  primary  activities  involve  financial 
intermediation (banking, trust funds, brokerages, etc.), insurance or real estate. 
Based on this conventional (albeit theoretically loose) definition of finance, 
and given our specific concern here with capitalist power, it seems appropriate to proxy 
the extent and trajectory of ‘financialization’ by looking at the distributive share of total 
net profit accounted for by FIRE corporations. The magnitude of this share would then 
indicate the extent to which FIRE firms have been able to leverage ‘financialization’ for 
their own end, and the way this share changes over time would tell us whether their 
leverage has increased or decreased. 
This distributional measure of ‘financialization’ is depicted by the two series in Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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Figure 4. The first series shows the net profit of FIRE corporations as a per cent of the net 
profit of all U.S.-listed firms. The second series computes the same ratio for firms listed 
outside the United States. And here we run into a little surprise.  
 
Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 4 4 4 4:  :  :  :     
Net Profit Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of  Net Profit Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of  Net Profit Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of  Net Profit Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of 
Region) Region) Region) Region)
    
 
NOTE: Net profit is computed as the ratio of market value to the price-earning ratio. Total 
profit and FIRE profit for firms outside the U.S. are calculated as a residual, by subtracting 
from  the  world  figures  the  corresponding  figures  for  the  U.S.  The  raw  earning  data  are 
reported on a consolidated basis, including domestic and foreign subsidiaries and the equity 
share in minority-held firms. The last data points are for November 30, 2011. 
 
SOURCE:  Datastream  (series  code:  TOTMKWD(MV)  and  TOTMKWD(PE)  for  the 
market value and price-earning ratio of all listed firms, respectively;  FINANWD(MV) and 
FINANWD(PE)  for  the  market  value  and  price-earning  ratio  of  all  listed  FIRE  firms, 
respectively;  TOTMKUS(MV) and TOTMKUS(PE) for the market value and price-earning 
ratio of U.S.-listed firms, respectively;  FINANUS(MV) and FINANUS(PE) for the market 
value and price-earning ratio of U.S.-listed FIRE firms, respectively). Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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According to the theory of hegemonic transition, the engine of ‘financialization’ is the 
United States. This is the black hole of the World System. It is the site where finance has 
been used most extensively to absorb the system’s surplus. It is the seat of the all-powerful 
Wall Street-Washington Complex. It is where neoliberal ideology first took command 
and from where it was later imposed with force and temptation on the rest of the world. It 
is the engine that led, pulled and pushed the entire process. 
But the facts in Figure 4 seem to tell a different story. According to the chart, 
the United Sates has not been leading the process. If anything, it seems to have been 
‘dragged’ into the process by the rest of the world. . . . 
During the early 1970s, before the onset of systemic ‘financialization’, the U.S. 
FIRE sector accounted for 6% of the total net profit of U.S.-listed firms. At the time, the 
comparable figure for the rest of the world was 18% – three times as high! From then on, 
the United States was merely playing catch-up. Its pace of ‘financialization’ has been faster 
than in the rest of the world; but with the sole exception of a brief period in the late 1990s, 
its level of ‘financialization’ has always been lower. In other words, if we wish to stick with 
the theory of a finance-fuelled red giant that has exhausted its own energy and is now 
slowly imploding as its peripheral liquidly runs out, we should apply that theory not to the 
United States, but to the rest of the world! 
Indeed, even the most recent period of crisis seems at odds with the theory. 
According to the conventional creed, both left and right, the current crisis is payback for 
the sins of excessive ‘financialization’ and improper bubble blowing (Bichler and Nitzan, 
2008; 2009). In this Galtonean theory, deviations and distortions always revert to mean, 
ensuring that the biggest sinners end up suffering the most. And since the U.S. FIRE 
sector was supposedly the main culprit, it was also the hardest hit.  
The only problem is that, according to Figure 4, the U.S. wasn’t the main 
culprit. On the eve of the crisis, the extent of ‘financialization’ was greater in the rest of the 
world than in the U.S. And yet, although the world’s financiers committed the greater sin, 
it was their U.S. counterparts who paid the heftier price. The former saw their profit share 
decline moderately from 37% to 23% of the total, while the latter watched their own share 
crash from 32% to 10%. And when the market finally rebounded, FIRE in the rest of the 
world recovered to about 30% (not far from its all-time high), while in the United States it 
reached barely 18% (a bit over half of its former record). It seems that the gods of finance 
have their own sense of justice.  
Or  maybe  not?  According  to  Michael  Hudson,  the  conventional  focus  on 
profit, although adequate in most cases, can be very deceptive when applied to the FIRE 
sector. The reason is twofold. First, there is the issue of tax accounting. The process of 
financialization,  he  says,  allows  FIRE  firms  to  leverage  their  political  primacy  over 
‘industrial’ companies by gradually reclassifying more and more of their profit as cost. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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They do that by claiming excessive depreciation and depletion allowances on their real-
estate  assets;  these  allowances  –  which  far  exceed  what  is  needed  to  replenish  the 
depreciation portion of the underlying real-estate – serve to reduce their taxable income, 
often to nil; and that reduction greatly boosts their after-tax cash flow. The second part of 
the  story  has  to  do  with  international  differences.  According  to  Hudson,  this  tax 
minimization by the FIRE sector has been much more successful in the United States 
than elsewhere in the world. And since FIRE firms capitalize their entire after-tax cash 
flow, focusing on net profit only – as we do in Figure 4 – is likely to produce a misleading 
picture. Our data in this figure show the net profit share of U.S.-listed FIRE firms to have 
lagged behind the comparable share of FIRE firms listed in the rest of world. But if instead 
of net profit we were to measure cash flow – i.e. net profit plus depreciation – the results 
would have been the exact opposite: U.S. FIRE would be the leader and the FIRE sector 
in the rest of the world the lagger.26  
We  find  these  claims  intriguing  but  unconvincing.  The  first  difficulty  is 
theoretical. It is certainly true that individual firms, investors and analysts often consider 
various measures of cash flow, particularly in short-term matters of mergers, acquisitions 
and  divestments.  But  in  general,  and  especially  over  the  longer  term,  the  ultimate 
yardstick that guides accumulation is not the ‘shadow measure’ of cash flow, but the 
legally sanctified entity of reported net earnings. 
The second difficulty has to do with the facts. Regardless of whether one uses 
net profit or cash flow, the conclusion seems to be the same: U.S.-listed FIRE firms are 
laggers  rather  than  leaders.  The  relevant  data  are  presented  in  Figure  5.  The  chart 
compares two series: the first series shows the cash flow of FIRE corporations as a per 
cent of the cash flow of all U.S.-listed firms; the second series computes the comparable 
ratio for FIRE firms listed outside the United States. Now, unlike the data for net profit, 
those for cash flow are more ‘jumpy’, perhaps as a result of the often arbitrary nature of 
depreciation allowances, occasional changes in tax laws and the absence of temporal 
smoothing  when  monthly  observations  are  interpolated  from  quarterly  and  annual 
reports. But the overall trajectories of the cash-flow series are not much different from 
those of net profit: in both cases, the FIRE share is larger outside than inside the United 
States, and in both cases the overall trend has been for U.S.-listed firms to play catch-up 
with the rest of the world, rather than vice versa. 
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 5 5 5 5:   :   :   :      
Cash Flow Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of Region) Cash Flow Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of Region) Cash Flow Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of Region) Cash Flow Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of Region)    
 
 
NOTE: Cash flow is the sum of net earnings and all non-cash charges or credits. Normally 
cash flow consists of net profit before preferred dividends, depreciation, amortization, reserve 
charges, provision for loan losses for banks and provision for future benefits for insurance 
companies;  it  excludes extraordinary  items  and  changes  in working  capital.  Cash  flow  is 
computed by dividing market value by the price-to-cash-flow ratio. Total cash flow and FIRE 
cash flow for firms outside the U.S. are calculated as a residual, by subtracting from the world 
figures the corresponding figures for the U.S. The last data points are for November 30, 2011. 
 
SOURCE:  Datastream  (series  code:  TOTMKWD(MV)  and  TOTMKWD(PC)  for  the 
market value and price-to-cash-flow ratio of all listed firms, respectively;  FINANWD(MV) 
and FINANWD(PC) for the market value and price-to-cash-flow ratio of all listed FIRE firms, 
respectively;  TOTMKUS(MV) and TOTMKUS(PC) for the market value and price-to-
cash-flow ratio of U.S.-listed firms, respectively;  FINANUS(MV) and FINANUS(PC) for the 
market value and price-earning ratio of U.S.-listed FIRE firms, respectively).   
 
 
And since we have already broadened the vista, it is worthwhile to extend the examination Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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to  cover  the  entire  flow  of  non-labour  corporate  income.  Figure  6  offers  such  a 
comparison by measuring the share of listed FIRE firms in EBIT – a shorthand for 
earnings before interest and taxes. This measure, reminiscent of the Marxist ‘surplus’ 
loosely measured in price terms, gives a broad view of capitalist income before it gets 
divided and appropriated by various capitalist and governmental entities. As before, one 
series in the chart measures the share of FIRE in the EBIT of all U.S.-listed firms, while the 
other measures the same share for FIRE firms listed in the rest of the world. Now, because 
it includes interest and taxes, EBIT is ‘looser’ than net profit and cash flow, and as such it 
cannot  easily  be  interpreted  as  a  proxy  for  capitalist  power.  And  yet  here,  too,  the 
historical conclusion stands: the U.S. FIRE sector has lagged the rest of the world. Until 
the late 1980s, the share of FIRE in EBIT was higher in the United States than elsewhere 
– but that was when both ratios were insignificantly small. However, once the two series 
started  to  rise,  U.S.-listed  FIRE  firms  consistently  lagged  behind  their  foreign 
counterparts.  
 
Figure  Figure  Figure  Figure 6 6 6 6:  :  :  :     
EBIT Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of Region) EBIT Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of Region) EBIT Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of Region) EBIT Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations (% of Region) 
 Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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NOTE: EBIT denotes corporate earnings before interest and taxes. Total EBIT and FIRE 
EBIT for firms outside the U.S. are calculated as a residual, by subtracting from the world 
figures the corresponding figures for the U.S. The last data points are for November 30, 2011. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series code: TOTMKWD(DWEB) and FINANWD(DWEB) for 
the EBIT of all listed firms and all listed FIRE firms, respectively; TOTMKUS(DWEB) and 
FINANUS(DWEB) for the EBIT of all U.S.-listed firms and U.S. FIRE firms, respectively). 
 
In other words, regardless of the particular flow – be it the quintessential measure of net 
profit or the wider indices of cash flow and EBIT – the pattern remains the same: the 
process of ‘financialization’, assuming we accept its standard definition, appears to have 
been ‘led’ not by the United States, but by the rest of the world.  
    
The End of a Nexus? The End of a Nexus? The End of a Nexus? The End of a Nexus?    
 
Of course, this isn’t the first time that a monkey wrench has been thrown into the wheels 
of the ever-changing nexus of imperialism and financialism. As we have seen, over the past 
century  the  nexus  has  had  to  be  repeatedly  altered  and  transformed  to  match  the 
changing reality. Its first incarnation explained the imperialist scramble for colonies to 
which finance capital could export its ‘excessive’ surplus. The next version talked of a neo-
imperial world of monopoly capitalism where the core’s surplus is absorbed domestically, 
sucked into a ‘black hole’ of military spending and financial intermediation. The third 
script  postulated  a  World  System  where  surplus  is  imported  from  the  dependent 
periphery into the financial core. And the most recent edition explains the hollowing out 
of the U.S. core, a ‘red giant’ that has already burned much of its own productive fuel and 
is now trying to ‘financialize’ the rest of the world in order to use the system’s external 
liquidity. 
Yet, here, too, the facts refuse to cooperate: contrary to the theory, they suggest 
that the U.S. ‘Empire’ has followed rather than led the global process of ‘financialization’, 
and that U.S. capitalists have consistently been less dependent on finance than their peers 
elsewhere.  
Of course, this inconvenient evidence could be dismissed as cursory – or, 
better still, neutralized by again adjusting the meaning of imperialism and financialism to 
fit  the  new  reality.  Undoubtedly,  there  are  those  who  will  hail  such  adjustment  as 
evidence of strength and vitality, the hallmark of a theory flexible enough to account for 
new circumstances. But too much flexibility makes for irrefutability. So maybe it is time to 
stop the carousel and cease the repeated retrofits. Perhaps we need to admit that, after a 
century of transmutations, the nexus of imperialism and financialism has run its course, 
and that we need a new framework altogether. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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Notes Notes Notes Notes
 
1 1  The  first  version  of  this  paper  was  posted  on  The  Bichler  &  Nitzan  Archives  in 
September 2009 (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/267/). Subsequent to this posting, we 
had an exchange of letters with Michael Hudson and Joe Francis. The correspondence 
with Francis was posted in January 2010 under the title ‘Imperialism and Financialism: 
An Exchange’ (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/278/). The present version endorses some 
of the insights and criticisms of Hudson and Francis; it also offers additional empirical 
evidence and considerations. 
2 2 As the article seeks to show, the precise terms are rather loose and their meaning varies 
across  theorists  and  over  time.  ‘Imperialism’,  ‘empire’  and  ‘colonialism’  are  used 
interchangeably, as are ‘finance’, ‘fictitious capital’, ‘finance capital’, ‘financialization’ 
and ‘financialism’. Here we use ‘imperialism’ and ‘financialism’ simply because they 
rhyme.  
3 See Hilferding (1910, p. 228), Sweezy (1942, p. 271) and the entire thrust of Baran and 
Sweezy (1966). Later on, Sweezy (1974) would defend himself and Baran against 
allegations of betrayal: Monopoly Capital, he said, had no intention of abandoning 
Marx’s labour theory of value. On the contrary, the book had taken Marx’s theory ‘for 
granted’, trying to show how labour values were transformed – first into competitive 
prices, and then into monopoly prices. However, as Howard and King (1992, p. 120) 
note, this defence was misleading and in fact unnecessary. Sweezy had always hailed the 
qualitative side of the labour theory of value, and that fact was worth reiterating; but to 
claim that he and Baran also took the quantitative aspects of that theory for granted was 
to contradict the gist of their own Monopoly Capital thesis.  
4 4  U.S.  National  Security  Council  (1950).  For  a  critical  examination  of  Military 
Keynesianism, see Nitzan and Bichler (2006). 
5 5 Classical Marxists interpret the role of waste rather differently. In their account, wasteful 
spending withdraws surplus from the accumulation process and therefore causes the 
pace of that process to decelerate. However, some classical Marxists, such as Kidron 
(1974), suggest that the deceleration may end up having a ‘positive’ impact: by slowing 
the pace at which constant capital accumulates, waste lessens the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall. 
6 6 Perhaps the clearest advocate of this argument was the late Harry Magdoff, a writer 
whose empirical and theoretical studies stand as a beacon of scientific research (1969; 
2003). Similar claims (minus the research) are offered by Meiksins Wood (2003). 
7  According  to  Baran  and  Sweezy  (1966,  p.  105),  foreign  investment  in  developing 
countries serves to aggravate the absorption problem: the returns on such investment 
are  not  fully  reinvested  in  the  periphery,  the  leftovers  flow  back  to  the  advanced 
countries and the surplus gets augmented instead of being offset. Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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8 8 The inverted commas in the referenced paragraph highlight concepts that the theory of 
unequal exchange can neither define nor measure. Since nobody knows the ‘correct’ 
value of labour power, it is impossible to determine the extent of exploitation in the two 
regions. Similarly, since no one knows the ‘true’ value of commodities, there is no way 
to  assess  whether  export  and  import  prices  are  too  ‘high’  or  too  ‘low’.  This  latter 
ignorance makes it impossible to gauge the degree to which the terms of trade are 
‘distorted’ and, indeed, in whose favour; and given that we don’t know the magnitude 
or even the direction of the ‘distortion’, it is impossible to tell whether surplus flows 
from the periphery to the core or vice versa, or how large the flow might be.  
9 The question of what constitutes a ‘proper’ Marxist framework is highlighted in the 
debates over the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Important contributions to 
these debates are Dobb (1946), Sweezy (1950) and Brenner (1977; 1978). For edited 
volumes on this issue, see Hilton, ed. (1978) and Aston and Philpin, eds. (1985).  
10 For more on the question of who is productive and who is not, see Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009, Ch. 7). 
1 11 1 For a succinct summary, see Arrighi and Silver (1999). Building on Braudel and Weber, 
they  outline  a  ‘demand  and  supply  theory  of  financialization’  (our  term).  On  the 
capitalist supply side, profits that grow relative to stagnating investment opportunities 
give rise to soaring financial liquidity. On the government demand side, budget deficits 
caused  by  stunted  growth  force  states  to  compete  for  liquid  capitalist  funds.  ‘All 
systemwide  financial  expansions  past  and  present’,  say  Arrighi  and  Silver,  ‘are  the 
outcome  of  the  combined  if  uneven  development  of  these  two  complementary 
tendencies’ (32). 
12 For the ‘depletion thesis’, see for example Melman (1970; 1974). A broader historical 
application is given in Kennedy (1987). The central role of finance in this depletion is 
emphasized in Hudson (2010). 
1 13 3 On the history of the national accounts, see Kendrick (1968; 1970). 
1 14 4 The generalization here applies to portfolio as well as foreign direct investment. Both 
are financial transactions, pure and simple. The only difference between them is their 
relative  size:  typically,  investments  that  account  for  less  than  10%  of  the  acquired 
property are considered portfolio, whereas larger investments are classified as direct. 
The flow of capital, whether portfolio or direct, may or may not be followed by the 
creation of new productive capacity. But the creation of such capacity, if and when it 
happens, is conceptually distinct, temporally separate and causally independent from 
the mere act of foreign investment. The act of foreign investment consists either of 
transferring  existing  ownership  titles  from  domestic  to  foreign  residents,  or  of 
simultaneously adding foreign ownership titles to the liabilities side of the balance sheet 
and cash and/or securities to the asset side. In the latter case, the additional funds on Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 5 (2012) 
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the assets side can then be put to various uses: they can be used to build new capacity or 
to speculate in the commodities market; they can be used to pay dividends or buy back 
the company’s share; they can be given to the government in return for short-term 
bonds or smuggled out of the country; etc. But the particular use, whatever it may be, is 
separate from the act of foreign investment and is entirely unrelated to whether that 
investment is portfolio or direct. 
1 15 5 The sample data for the earlier years are not only more inaccurate; most likely, they are 
also  systematically  biased.  The  reason  is  that  the  ratio  of  foreign  assets  to  GDP, 
particularly during the earlier years, was probably smaller in the countries excluded 
from the sample than in the countries included in it; and if that is indeed the case, the 
smaller the sample was, the more it overstated the actual global ratio. Obstfeld and 
Taylor  compute  a  ‘hybrid’  ratio  between  the  sample  foreign  assets  and  the  global 
(rather than the sample) GDP. The resulting estimates are lower than those reported in 
Figure 1, but their temporal pattern is the same. For a visual comparison of these two 
estimates, see Francis, Bichler and Nitzan (2010, Figure 2, p. 7). 
1 16 6 The conventional view, at least until recently, was that global capital mobility is cyclical 
more than secular, and that the levels of foreign ownership reached at the end of the 
twentieth century still pale in comparison to those recorded at the beginning of that 
century (see, for example, Hirst and Thompson 1999, pp. 27-29). This conclusion, 
though, owed less to the facts and more to misleading calculations. Most analysts, 
having no access to the actual data on foreign assets and capital flow, relied on the 
indirect evidence offered by the current account. The logic was that countries that run 
current account deficits must cover those deficits with capital inflow, so if one sums up 
the deficits across all countries, the result must be equal, by definition, to the overall 
sum  of  global  capital  flow.  This  logic,  though,  is  valid  only  if  capital  flows  in  one 
direction – from countries  with current account surplus to  countries with current 
account deficit. But over the past half century, capital has been increasingly flowing in 
both  directions;  and  with  this  two-way  flow  –  inward  and  outward  –  the  overall 
movement of capital and the level of foreign assets are no longer related to changes in 
the current accounts. For more on this issue, see Wallich (1984) and Nitzan (2001). 
1 17 7 Farrell et al. (2008, p. 73, Exhibit 3.10). Not surprisingly, the United States, which still 
has the world’s largest pool of capitalized assets, exhibits the lowest levels of inward 
transnationalization. But these levels, although low relative to other countries, are by no 
means trivial: in 2006, foreigners owned 14% of all U.S.-listed equities, 22% of its listed 
bonds, and 20% of the combined value of the two – up from negligible levels in 1990 
(p. 74, Exhibits 3.11 and 3.12).  
1 18 8 For the BP episode, see Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan (1989, pp. 5-6). For the Barclays 
Bank story, see Larsen (2009). 
1 19 9 For the effect on these conclusions of a changing sample of countries, see the debate in Imperialism and Financialism, Bichler & Nitzan (pp. 42-78)  
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Francis, Bichler and Nitzan (2010, pp. 1-2 and 7-8). 
2 20 0 Joe Francis provides a further breakdown of global ownership by region (Francis, 
Bichler, and Nitzan 2010, pp. 14-15).  
2 21 1 There are of course other important yardsticks for capitalist power, such as risk, hype 
and the normal rate of return. But these yardsticks are intimately related to profit, and 
given  that  our  concern  here  is  long-term  tendencies,  the  use  of  net  profit  seems 
warranted.  
2 22 2  Using  the  data  from  Figure  3,  Joe  Francis  showed  that  there  is  a  relatively  tight 
correlation  between  the  declining  net  profit  share  of  U.S.-listed  firms  and  the 
devaluating U.S. dollar. In principle, the dollar’s devaluation can impact the U.S. profit 
share in two opposite ways: on the one hand, nominal devaluation lowers earnings 
reported in U.S. dollars relative to earnings reported in other currencies (although with 
U.S. corporations earning more and more of their profits abroad, the effect of this 
process  has  been  progressively  mitigated);  on  the  other  hand,  devaluation  (after 
corrections for relative inflation rates), makes U.S.-made goods and services relatively 
cheaper,  and  that  cheapening  should  enable  U.S.-based  firms  to  raise  their  global 
market share. Based on Joe Francis’ data, the former (negative) effect has completely 
overwhelmed the latter (positive) impact, suggesting that U.S. firms were unable to 
turn cheaper exports to their advantage. More broadly, and assuming one accepts the 
nationally based approach to capitalist power (which we, personally, do not), the very 
decline of the U.S. dollar should  be indicative of the waning global power  of U.S. 
capitalists. For more on this issue, see Francis, Bichler and Nitzan (2010, p. 3, Figure 1, 
as well as pp. 8-9 and 16).  
2 23 3 For a detailed analysis of the associated difficulties and impossibilities that we discuss in 
this section only in passing, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009, Chs. 6-8 and 10) and Bichler 
and Nitzan (2009). 
2 24 4 The reference here is only to classical Marxists. Neo-Marxists, at least those who have 
given  up  on  the  labour  theory  of  value,  lack  any  objective  means  of  separating 
productive from unproductive activity to start with. 
2 25 5 Note that ‘private enterprises’ here include mortgaged home owners, and that the 
national statisticians subject many of the interest data to cruel imputations. 
2 26 6  The  argument  regarding  the  key  role  of  depreciation  and  depletion  allowances  is 
elaborated in Hudson (2010). His suggestion that the deprecation allowances of U.S.-
listed FIRE firms are much larger (if not infinitely larger) than those of FIRE firms 
listed outside the United States, and therefore that the data in Figure 4 are misleading, 
was made in a series of private communications with us in September 2009.  
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